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ABSTRACT
We analyse efficiency problems of incentive-compatible contracts under moral
hazard and/ or adverse selection in the context of private resource management. The paper
contributes to defining the regulatory role in creating an optimal information environment
between regulator and private resource managers to maximize welfare from a mixed public-
private good. The optimal contract structures developed in a principal-agent framework
induce self-selection and type-specific conservation efforts. The associated contracting
inefficiencies, however, are increasing in the degree of information asymmetry across
scenarios, the total costs of conservation, and the difference in conservation costs across
types. The results of this study imply that conservation contracts to mitigate problems of
moral hazard and adverse selection are welfare improving if efficiency gains from private
management outweigh the inefficiencies associated with incentive compatible contract
design. Alternatively, the regulator can choose to retain information on 'types' and 'effort'
during institutional transformations.3
INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses efficiency problems of incentive-compatible contracts under
asymmetric information in the context of private resource management. While private
decision-making in natural resources management internalizes external effects where open
access leads to resource degradation and the dissipation of economic rents [1]; alleviates
public deficits or borrowing requirements [31];  improves the livelihoods of local
communities; and is often more efficient than management by cumbersome public
bureaucracies [31], its drawbacks when used as an institutional choice deserve attention. In
particular, the delegation of decision-making authority to private agents introduces an
agency problem, when used to serve “legitimate public interest goals” [31]. The agency
problem results as private agents, who are entrusted with the management of fisheries,
forestry or wildlife for private and public benefits, are typically better informed about their
(costly) compliance with relevant conservation measures, and the specific resource
characteristics, hence the underlying conservation costs. Accordingly, the informational
implications of private provision of goods and services, formerly provided by the public
sector, have to be traded-off with potential efficiency gains from privatization.
The policy implications of informational problems when (hidden effort, hidden
type) to regulate management behaviour are well recognised in both the general economic
1
as well as the environmental and natural resource economics
2 literature. The literature
acknowledges that information is imperfect, costly to obtain, and asymmetrically
distributed amongst interacting economic parties. It has made significant progress in
identifying economic contexts with information asymmetries, designing incentive-
compatible regulatory instruments for independent or interdependent individual decision-
makers, and describing the analytical properties of incentive schemes and selection
mechanisms, and their equilibria [36].
3 However, the applied information economics
literature still provides little structured comparison of the extent of inefficiencies associated
with different degrees of information asymmetries (i.e. different information
environments). Moreover, little has been said about the informational implications for
processes of institutional transformation from public to private provision of a public or
mixed good. Here, the regulator has leverage in choosing the information environment, and
confronts the task of trading-off efficiency gains through private resource management with
the inefficiencies associated with incentive-compatible regulatory instruments. Thus, the
                                                
1 See [2; 8-12; 17; 20; 23; 25; 27; 28; 32; 35].
2 See [3-7; 16; 18; 19; 21; 24; 26; 30; 33; 34; 38-40].
3  According to Stiglitz [36], the contributions on information asymmetries overturn conventional results in economics
as mathematical restrictions that formed the basis of general equilibrium analysis become insufficient, the non-
existence of market equilibrium becomes possible, and competitive markets may not be Pareto efficient.4
efficiency gains from private decision-making net of associated contracting inefficiencies
4
need to be compared to a situation of retaining (or improving) the regulator's information
about 'effort' and or on 'type' when choosing the degree of privatization. This paper
contributes to filling this gap.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate efficiency problems of incentive-
compatible contracts when agents are privately informed about actions (moral hazard) and/
or characteristics (adverse selection) in the context of private natural resource management.
In comparing the magnitude of the contracting inefficiencies associated with increasingly
more complex information asymmetries, this study provides guidance for conservation
policy design under asymmetric information. The paper contributes to the discussion about
the regulatory role in creating an optimal information environment between regulator and
private resource managers to maximize welfare from a mixed public-private good.
Specifically, it develops increasingly more complex information scenarios, and addresses
the problems of 'hidden effort' and 'hidden types' simultaneously in the contract design.
The paper proceeds as follows. It develops a principal-agent model to analyse a
sequence of informational environments with different degrees of information asymmetry
between one regulator and individual resource managers.
5 The sequence of models is based
on Wu and Babcock [38;  39], but extends their work significantly by allowing for noisy
observations of conservation outcome. It develops incentive compatible contracts to induce
socially optimal and type-specific conservation efforts for increasing degrees of
informational asymmetry, and analytically isolates the contracting inefficiencies. Using
numerical simulations, the paper compares the magnitude of associated contracting
inefficiencies across 'hidden effort only', 'hidden type only' and 'hidden effort - hidden type'
to the first best outcome with full information. In addition, it analyzes the effects of
differences in opportunity costs of conservation, and discusses the question of additivity of
contracting inefficiencies when 'hidden effort' and 'hidden type' are addressed
simultaneously in the contract design.
6
The paper derives the following main results: The optimal contract structures
induce self-selection and type-specific conservation efforts. The associated contracting
inefficiencies are increasing in (i) the degree of information asymmetry across scenarios,
(ii) the total opportunity costs of conservation, and (iii) the difference in conservation costs
across types. Regarding the additivity of contracting inefficiencies, we find that contracts
designed for firms, who manage sites with relatively low opportunity costs of conservation
                                                
4 The paper refers to contracting inefficiencies as the agency cost from risk premia and information rents.
5 In focusing on problems of 'hidden effort' and 'hidden types', the paper abstracts from some other important realities of
developing resource management contracts, such as (i) multiple-site management, (ii) multiple-agent management,
and (iii) combining multiple signals, and (iv) possible effects of a dynamic contracting setting.
6 According to Stewart [35], contracting inefficiencies are 'super-additive' when the sum of the inefficiencies resulting
from the individual problems of 'hidden effort' plus 'hidden types' is smaller than the contracting inefficiency of the
combined problem of 'hidden effort - hidden type'. In case of the converse, efficiencies are 'sub-additive'.5
show super-additive contracting inefficiencies, while those designed for sites with
relatively high opportunity costs of conservation are sub-additive. Consequently, whether
or not the aggregate contracting inefficiencies are super- or sub- additive depends on the
proportions of different types. For the design of conservation policies the results of this
study imply that conservation contracts to address both types of information problems are
warranted only if efficiency gains from private management override the inefficiencies
associated with incentive compatible contract design. Depending on the specific
information environment between a regulator and private resource managers, it might be
advisable to retain information on 'types' and 'effort' on part of the regulator in phases of
institutional transformation. Retrieving this information from the firms once the
information environment has been altered might be prohibitively costly.
THE MODEL
Conservation and Production
The principal-agent model of optimal resource conservation contracts uses a forest
management context. The results, however, are generally applicable to incentive problems
of delegating management responsibilities from public to private managers. It is assumed
that the regulator or the owner of the resource (principal) provides the institutional structure
and contractual specifications by which a total of n forest companies (agents), each
managing one forest site of standardized size, may use publicly owned resources to
maximize profits. In delegating forest management responsibilities to individual firms, the
regulator aims at jointly maximizing private and public net social forest benefits
7 minus
program costs. To achieve this, the regulator offers conservation performance based tenure
arrangements, also referred to in this paper as conservation contracts.
 8 If timber is extracted
from a forest site, it is socially optimal that the firm expend an ex ante known amount of
conservation effort
9, which is determined by the habitat conservation value of each site.
                                                
7  Public benefits include all non-wood forest benefits derived from a standing forest, such as non-wood use values,
option values of future and presently not-known uses and existences values of uncut timber. Some literature refers to
these benefits as "non-timber benefits", which is imprecise in that it is the timber on the stand, which contributes non-
productive forest benefits. A better term to use is non-wood benefits as suggested by [22; 29].
8  Conservation performance is measured as the sum of public benefits provided per forest unit. The model assumes that
it is possible to standardize and transform all public forest benefits into comparable units, so that P represents a single,
objectively measurable conservation index.
Conservation contract refers to a bundle of observable expected conservation performance and an associated expected
tax/ transfer (incentive schedule). The regulator offers a menu of contracts from which firms choose according to their
underlying and privately known resource setting.
9  Conservation efforts are all actions taken by the firms to mitigate public resource benefit loss. Whenever a site is
logged, the model assumes that the firm fully or partly abates losses by expending effort. These actions comprise the
protection of individual or a group of species of flora and fauna, as identified in a forest management plan.6
The forest provides two stylized categories of goods and services: timber, q,
representing the group of private goods, and conservation benefits, P, that comprise all
public forest benefits. In the forestry context of this paper, P refers to habitat conservation
benefits, which do not enhance the benefits from cut timber, from the standing forest. Cast
within a discrete framework, the model assumes that all forest sites are identical in their
production characteristics, but differ in terms of the sites' ability to provide habitat for a
particular species ('type'). There exist high quality sites and low quality sites, denoted as k
= l, h, which are determined by underlying sites characteristics, such as location, tree
species composition, predators, etc. These characteristics, in turn, drive the marginal
conservation cost per unit of P on each site, and, accordingly, the optimal conservation
effort choice. Low conservation quality (type l) sites provide expected public good benefits
at lower marginal and total conservation cost than high quality (type h) sites.
Each firm may choose one of three conservation effort levels, ei, with i = o, l, h.
Here, eo denotes a level of conservation effort without regulation
10, while l and h denote
high and low conservation effort, respectively. According to the equi-marginal principal,
firms optimally expend high conservation effort levels on sites with high conservation
quality, and low conservation effort levels on sites with low conservation quality,
11 unless
program costs dictate otherwise, as will be discussed. Each firm's timber production
technology is represented by
q = q(x, ei) Eq. 1
where q denotes the deterministic timber output of an individual site, the scalar
value x represents a scalar value of production inputs and ei denotes conservation effort. q
is concave in x, with ∂ q/ ∂ x > 0 and ∂  
2q/ ∂ x
2 < 0. Moreover q is assumed to be linearly
decreasing in ei, which implies that production output decreases at a constant rate as the
firm increases its effort. Changes in the marginal products of x and ei are assumed to be
independent, i.e. ∂  
2q/ ∂ x ∂ e = ∂  
2q/∂ e ∂ x = 0, which implies that x and ei are chosen
independently.
Public forest benefits, P (measured as conservation performance), flow from the
standing forest. The firm's conservation technology is represented by
P = P (ei,ε , k) Eq. 2
which is a function of conservation effort, ei, a type parameter, k, and a stochastic
disturbance, ε . P is monotonically increasing and concave in ei, where ∂ P/ ∂ ei > 0 and ∂  
2P/
∂ ei
2 < 0. Two random outcomes of public good benefits, Po and Pz, are possible, where P0 <
                                                
10  eo is a base effort level, motivated by firms' self interest, or a widely accepted conservation practices.
11 A standard assumption in principal agent models is that the regulator knows the marginal trade-off between the goods
(here: aggregated public and private forest values) at all effort levels for each forest site k, based on social public and
private benefit values, and the probabilistic and type-specific relationship between effort and conservation outcome.7
Pz. Each firm chooses its effort levels, ei, to maximize profits. Random disturbances,
however, affect Pj at all effort levels, ei according to the type parameter k = l or h.
Type differences are conceptualized as type-specific expected conservation
technologies [13; 14]. In the discrete model, this translates into type-specific conditional





ei). They represent the probabilities of observing a particular conservation performance, Pj,
conditional on effort level, ei, and the firm's type k. Each type can provide either P0 or Pz,
but higher quality sites have a higher conditional probability of yielding Pz at any effort
level ei, than type l sites. Consequently, type h sites show a higher expected value of public
benefits  ) , ( k e P i  for every level of ei than type l sites. Higher quality sites show a higher
conditional probability of yielding Pz at any effort level ei, than type l sites. Moreover, ρ
k
ji
is specified such that the following conditions hold: (i) stochastic dominance, i.e. the
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for i = o, l, h); (iii) expected marginal productivity of effort is higher for type h sites than

















subsequently show (see proposition 1) that the single crossing property holds: Type h sites
achieve a given expected amount of P less costly than type l sites, implying less forgone
production, q, and private profits. Without any production, i.e. at q = 0, conservation effort
is ei = o, as no public benefit loss is mitigated, and sites provide P according to their
inherent expected potential, P
k. Each firm is required to take some preventative effort to
avoid public benefits loss, but firms do so at different levels, according to the underlying
habitat quality. Without any production, i.e. at q = 0, conservation effort is ei = 0, as no
public benefit loss is mitigated, and sites provide public benefits according to their inherent
expected potential, P
ko.
The Firm's Optimization Problem
Each firm maximizes expected utility of net revenues. They are risk-averse with a
von-Neuman-Morgenstern expected utility function over lotteries of net revenues EU[.].
The unregulated firm maximizes utility of timber profits over its choice of inputs, x, and
sets e = e0. Without regulation, each individual firm solves
] ) , ( [ )] ( [ max wx e x q p U x U o o o
x − = π Eq. 3
where π 0 and U0 denote the firm's reservation profit, and the corresponding
reservation utility at e0, respectively.
12 Accordingly, x
* = argmax {p q (x, e0) –w x} is the
solution to the maximization problem. With v denoting cost per unit of effort, profits at
effort levels el or eh are
                                                
12 A firm chooses optimal input level, x*, as a function of timber characteristics of the stand independently of
conservation effort, which allows for treating the timber extraction decision as independent from the conservation
decision. In response, conservation effort mitigates potential public good losses.8
] ) , ( [ )] , ( [
* * *
l l l l e v wx e x q p U e x U − − ≡ π
and Eq. 4
] ) , ( [ )] , ( [
* * *
h h h h e v wx e x q p U e x U − − ≡ π
Total conservation costs comprise (i) reductions of timber production through the
effects of ei on q, and (ii) cost per unit of ei, which will be normalized to v = 1. The
difference between reservation profits and profits at ei, for i = l, h is given as
() i i o i o i e e x q e x q p e x e x d + − = − = ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , (
* * * * π π Eq. 5
With concavity of q in e, it follows that π (x
*, eo) > π (x
*, el) > π (x
*, eh), since eo < el




0 = π 0 and π 0 > π  (x
*, el) ≥  π  (x
*, eh). For notational clarity, let di = d(x
*,
ei) and π i = π (x
*, ei), where dh > dl > d0  and π 0 > π l > π h.
Firm's Participation and Incentive Compatibility Constraint
The models of contract design with asymmetric information isolate the necessary
deviations (contracting inefficiencies) from full information first best to induce optimal
effort levels. Let the incentive schedule, i.e. the additional component to an existing







k(Pj) is an individual transfer
based on the observed conservation performance. Following a standard principal-agent
approach, the firm's participation and its first-order conditions constrain the regulator's
problem. To make conservation contracting attractive for the firms, the regulator offers a
contract, which satisfies each firm's reservation utility, such that
  0 ] , [ U T EU
k
i
k ≥ π Eq. 6
Faced with performance-based contracts, each firm maximizes expected utility of





on type h and type l sites optimally taking eh and el, respectively, this generalizes to:
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+ + + − = =
∈
π ρ π ρ π Eq. 7
The optimality conditions define the incentive-compatibility constraint to the
regulator's problem. To induce the socially optimal effort choice he incentive schedule must
satisfy each firm's incentive compatibility constraint:
                                                
13 With unobservable site types, the incentive schedules are type-unspecific, and the schedule is denoted tj.9
] , [ ] , [ j k i
k
j k i
k T EU T EU ≠ = ≥ π π   with  k = l, h  and  i = l, h Eq. 8
Expected Welfare Maximization with Information Costs
The regulator’s objective function is composed of type-specific commercial
profits, π i, plus public good benefits, P(ei), which are weighted by the proportion of the
respective site types, υ
k. Program costs, which comprise expenditures for the incentive
scheme, E[T]
k,
14 and a fixed component , C(M
s), for administration and enforcement, need
to be subtracted. C(M
s) denotes the regulator's expenditures for implementing a regulatory
instrument, which vary with the information scenarios, s, under consideration.
Public resource management bears a positive information externality, in that the
regulator remains well informed about the firm's compliance and the habitat characteristics
of individual sites. This will be referred to as the full information environment, with
perfectly observable conservation behaviour of each firm and their resource settings. As the
regulator reduces own management responsibilities and the associated management
expenditures, the information environment becomes increasingly asymmetric. Accordingly,
C (M
fi) > C (M
he) > C (M
he/ht), where s = fi , he, he - ht refers to ‘full (symmetric)
information’, ‘hidden effort only’, and ‘hidden effort - hidden type’, respectively.
Regulations are socially costly as they are financed by distortionary taxes,
represented by λ
15 Since n,λ , υ
k and C(M
s) are parameters and constants, respectively, these
terms are omitted from the cost minimization problem, when determining the optimal
incentive schedules. However, these parameters cannot be ignored altogether as they
influence the magnitude of total program costs, and thus the economic feasibility of the
conservation program. The specific formulation of the firm's participation and incentive-
compatibility constraints and which of the constraints is binding depends on the particular
information scenario. This will be developed further down.
Given that the regulator wishes to induce predetermined effort levels, the welfare
maximization problem transforms into a program cost minimization problem. In most
general terms for the sequence of models, the regulator solves:
)} ( ] [ ] [ { )] ( [ min
] [
s h h l l s
T E
M C T E T E n GP C E





k U T EU ≥ = ] , [π for k, i = l, h Eq. 10
                                                
14 E[T
k], with E[T]
k = Σ j(ρ
k
j,i=k * tj) for k, i = l, h, and j =  z, o, denotes expected incentive transfer conditional on signal
j.
15 The literature suggests a range of 0.2 to 0.5 for every tax dollar raised [38; 39].10





k T EU T EU ≠ = ≥ π π for k, i = l, h Eq. 11




Both, regulator and firms have costless access to the same information set with
equal beliefs about the conditional probabilities of observing Pj, with  j = o, z given ei and
type k. Thus, no incentive problem exists, and state-independent and site-specific contracts
in terms of effort levels and transfers, t
k (ei), will induce efficient efforts. The choice of t
k
(ei) must satisfy the participation constraints for each type, while inducing el and eh.
Formulating equations 9 to11 as
{} { } ) ( ) ( ) ( min
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zh U e t U e t U ≥ + + + − )] ( [ )] ( [ 1 π ρ π ρ Eq. 14
minimizes program costs when both participation constraints hold with equality.
18
Standard theory suggests [15; 27; 37] that with full information the incentive
schedule is independent of observed conservation outcome. The risk-neutral principal
shares risk optimally with each firm. It reimburses each for their cost, independent of the
outcome, if ei=k is observed, but transfers nothing or imposes a fine for any other
observation of effort. The resulting payment schedule for each type is:
Sites type l t
l(el) = dl and t
l(ei ≠  k) ≤  0   Eq. 15
Sites type h t
h(eh) = dh and t
h(ei ≠  k) ≤   0 Eq. 16
                                                
16 This section characterises an incentive-compatible contract design with full information, hidden effort only, and
hidden effort - hidden type. The results will then be used to isolate contracting inefficiencies, assess the implications
of parameter changes, and provide policy guidance on the impact of information asymmetries, when delegating to
contacting of private resource managers is used as a policy instrument.
17 All relevant contract variables and parameters, such as each site's type, k (resource setting), each firm's conservation
performances, P, the firm's individual efforts, ei and the private and public values of each site are costlessly observable
by the regulator and the firms.








oh. The notation t
k(ei) emphasizes the observability of effort.11
Naturally, firms choose the optimal type-specific effort. Contracting costs plus
monitoring costs are





l fi M C d d GP C + + = υ υ Eq. 17
Contract Structures with Hidden Individual Conservation Effort
In this model, site types are observable, and the regulator offers site-specific
contracts to each firm. With t
k
j = t
k(Pj) the the pay-offs are strictly based on Pj, which is
used as an observable signal indicative of each firm’s effort. Each individual firm's
participation constraint is:








zl U t U t U ≥ + + + − π ρ π ρ Eq. 18








zh U t U t U ≥ + + + − π ρ π ρ Eq. 19
With three discrete effort levels, there exist two incentive compatibility constraints
for each type. However, only one incentive compatibility constraint will be binding for
each type, as type l must be prevented from taking eo, while type h must be prevented from
taking el or eo.
19 To simplify the analytical set-up, but without any loss of generality, the
model imposes ρ
k
zo = 0 for eo, while for el or eh it follows ρ
k
zi≠ o≠  0 on both site types.
Equation 11 becomes:
ICC for a type l site
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 where  ρ
l
z0 = 0, Eq. 20
and
ICC for a type h site
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π ρ π ρ
 where ρ
h
zl > 0.  Eq. 21
The constraints implicitly define the conditions for the pay-off schedule for each
type. While each firm's participation constraint determines the absolute magnitude of the
                                                
19  Notice that the incentive to prevent effort choice el nests prevention of effort choice eo. If the incentive for type h is
chosen large enough to prevent effort el, then it is also large enough to prevent choice eo.12






Since individual group identities of each site are known, the regulator minimizes
program costs separately for each type, k = l, h. The optimality conditions are derived
separately for each site type by solving the respective first order conditions.
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zl U U U t U π π π ρ − = − +  Eq. 23
For type l sites, the assumption ρ
l
z0 = 0 implies t
l
o = 0,
20 such that * l
z t  remains the
choice variable in this problem, and the participation and incentive-compatibility
constraints for type l collapse into one equation.
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o] for each type. Both of type h's constraints are satisfied at
minimum expenditure for the incentive schedule (i.e. a firm with a type h is just indifferent
to taking eh over any other effort level), if to
h and tz
h are chosen such that the utility from
taking el and producing a positive signal Pz with probability ρ
h
zl equals the difference in
utility from taking el plus receiving t0 and from taking e0. The firm's expected marginal
utility derived from choosing efficient effort (over any other effort level) equals the
marginal forgone utility from doing so.





z will be greater than, equal to, or less than zero if ρ
k
zi ≠  0.13
Risk exposure of a risk-averse firm, induced by a pay-off schedule which is
conditional on conservation performance, necessitates the inclusion of a risk premium into
the firm’s pay-off.
21 This leaves the firm indifferent to accepting the contractual gamble for
public benefit conservation, or not managing public lands. Accordingly, the expected


















zh r d t t + = − + 0 1 ρ ρ  Eq. 27
After re-arranging, the state-contingent transfers for each type are written as:
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0  Eq. 29
Total expected program costs are now:
{} { } ) ( )] ( [ M C r d r d GP C E
he h h h l l l he + + + + ≡ υ υ  Eq. 30
Contract Structures with Hidden Effort and Hidden Site Types
22
To clarify the regulatory problem of designing incentive compatible conservation
contracts in the presence of hidden site types and unobservable effort levels, recall the
conceptualisation of type differences as the sites' specific resource settings influencing the
expected conservation function. Type differences are expressed in the conditional
probabilities ρ
k
ji. If the regulator observes only the stochastic signal Pj, and firms are
privately informed about type, firms who manage type h sites have an incentive to
deliberately misrepresent their type as they are able to systematically increase their total
pay-off. By choosing el, but being type h, the firms incur opportunity costs of dl, but receive
an expected transfer, which exceeds this conservation cost, because they consistently
                                                
21  The risk premium is the amount over and above the opportunity cost of ei=k, to satisfy the firm's participation
constraint.
22  The sites' resource settings are privately known by firms, while the regulator monitors noisy conservation
performance. The performance oriented incentive schedule induces firms with a type l site to prefer the expected
utility from choosing e = el over e = e0 and the firms with a type h site to prefer the expected utility from choosing eh
over el.14
provide the signal Pz with a higher probability than anticipated by. To prevent type
misrepresentation, firms need to reveal their type identity a priori.
23
For the combined hidden effort - hidden type model, firms are assumed to be risk-
neutral. This allows for providing an explicit analytical solution for the contract design with
hidden effort and hidden type, and may also be a more realistic description of a firm's risk
preferences.
 24 The assumptions ρ
k




zh > 0 are maintained.
The regulator offers an incentive schedule which induces type-specific efficient
effort levels on each site. Firms face identical offers contingent on the signal about their
conservation performance, indicated by dropping superscript k on the payment schedule, tj.
The regulator's cost minimization problem is simultaneously constrained by the firms'
participation and incentive compatibility conditions for both site types. This adds an
additional layer of complexity to the analysis, but is considerably simplified by proposition
1 (see appendix 3), which formalizes the single crossing property for the case of two
observable outcomes and three effort levels. Proposition 1 builds on the assumption that
expected marginal productivity of effort is higher for type h than for type l sites for all ei. It












zl are sufficient to define
a type l site as less conservation efficient than a type h site.
With hidden effort and hidden type, the regulator solves the optimization problem:
{} { } 0 0
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After solving the first-order conditions, the optimal incentive schedule T
he-ht = [tz ;
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23 See appendix 2 for an illustration of type differences and the resulting incentive problem.
24 Risk-neutrality of firms eliminates the inefficiency associated with the imperfect signal when firms are risk-averse.
The set-up places the analytical focus on analyzing the information rent embedded in the incentive schedule, where
firms have a linear utility function,  ] [ ] [ j i j i t t U + = + π π .15
Several observations about the incentive schedule can be drawn from t0 and tz:




z. This is not surprising, as for dh= dl, it must hold that el = eh,
which implies that the efficient effort levels on both site types are equal. This,
however, would be true only if there are no differences in the site types in terms of
their conservation efficiency, i.e. all sites provide the same expected conservation
outcome conditional on effort. Without type differences and given the firms' risk
neutrality, the regulator offers a flat payment, independent of outcomes.
(2) If dh≠  dl, the incentive schedule depends on the observed signal Pj. Each transfer, tj,
consists of two parts:
(i) A base transfer, which covers the cost of taking el, i.e. dl, thus satisfying the
firm's participation constraint;






zl ρ ρ ρ − / is always > 0, it
reduces the base transfer when signal P0 is observed. Likewise, the base





(3) Moreover, we can establish that t
*
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zl ρ ρ ρ − > . This implies that t0 is negative, if the
type l site's marginal probability of producing signal Pz when taking el is greater
than type h site's marginal probability of producing signal Pz when taking eh. In
other words: The marginal expected increment for conservation performance is
larger for type l, when choosing el over eo, than it is for type h when choosing eh
over el.
(4) The components of to and tz , which will be either subtracted from or added to the
base payment, are interpreted as follows:
(i) The first part, (dh - dl), is the marginal cost of choosing eh over el.
(ii) The second part is a ratio of (a) the conditional probability of producing signal
Pj when being type l, over (b) the differences in conditional probabilities of
producing signal Pz when being type h and choosing eh over el. The term
resembles the likelihood ratio, but relates type differences.
For t0, this ratio is the conditional probability of producing signal Pz when
being type l and taking el over the marginal conditional probability of
producing Pz, when being type h and taking eh over el.
For tz, this ratio is the conditional probability of producing signal P0 when
being type l and taking el over the marginal conditional probability of
producing Pz, when being type h and taking eh over el.16
This incentive schedule satisfies type-specific participation and incentive
compatibility conditions. The firms will choose el and eh on sites type l and h, respectively,
while each firm receives a type-dependent expected transfer (see appendix 4) of:
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A firm with a type l site receives an expected transfer, which exactly covers its
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Given the assumptions on ρ
k
zi, the specification of the incentive scheme does not





 The results imply that the regulator can induce the efficient effort levels by
specifying the performance based incentive schedule. However, to induce type revelation a
priori at the time of signing the contract, the regulator would specify a contract menu in
terms of the total expected transfer and expected provision of signal Pz. From the literature
on self-selecting contracts it is known that the expected transfer to the more efficient firm
(here: a firm with a site of type h) covers total costs of effort plus an information rent to
prevent type misrepresentation. Noting dh as total costs, the expected information rent is
E
h[I] = E
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The information rent consists of two terms. The first term is the marginal cost of
choosing eh over el. The second term is the ratio of (i) marginal type difference in the
conditional probability of producing signal Pz when taking effort el; and (ii) marginal
conditional probability type h of producing signal Pz when taking effort eh over el.  With the
assumptions of the model about the conditional probabilities of effort, the second term of
the information rent is positive. Moreover, the second term will be greater than 1 (i.e. the
information rent will be greater than the marginal cost of eh), if site type h's marginal
conditional probability of producing signal Pz from taking el , (i), is larger than type h's
marginal conditional probability of producing signal Pz from taking el over eh, (ii).
However, the information rent is smaller than the marginal cost of eh, if the converse is the
case.  Total program costs at the optimum are given by
) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( )] ( [
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COMPARATIVE STATICS ACROSS INFORMATION SCENARIOS
The objective of this section is to identify the implications of parameters changes
for the contracting costs. The analytical results will be supported by numerical illustrations.
This is the basis for analysing policies of contracting under asymmetric information.
Conservation Costs
Proposition 2:With hidden effort only, total expected contracting costs are increasing in
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The proof of proposition 2 is provided in the appendix 5. As conservation costs are
part of the contracting costs of the firm’s pay-off, the pay-off must increase, as the
conservation costs increase to satisfy the reservation constraint. However, the numerical
examples will also demonstrate that the increase in total contracting costs is not only due to
larger conservation cost, but also to the increase in the respective risk premia.
In the hidden effort - hidden type model, contractual inefficiencies are captured in
the information rents granted to type h sites. The following analysis focuses on responses of
the information rent of type h sites to changes in the underlying conservation costs.
Proposition 3:With hidden effort and hidden type, the information rent to types h sites is
increasing in conservation costs of type h sites, dh, but decreasing in
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The proof of proposition 3 is provided in the appendix 6. The proposition implies
that if the opportunity costs of conservation on site type increase, the information rent must
increase as well to prevent type misrepresentation. However, if the opportunity costs of site
type l increase, then the necessary information rent to site type h decreases. In a later
section, I will complement the analytical results with numerical examples, and analyse
simultaneous changes of dl and dh.
Ease of Type Misrepresentation18
Proposition 4:With hidden effort and hidden type, the information rent to type h sites is
increasing in type h' s conditional probability of producing signal Pz, when
taking effort level el, but decreasing in type l' s conditional probability of


























Proposition can be interpreted as a measure for the ease of type misrepresentation.
The larger site difference in terms of the conditional probability of producing a more
favourable signal, Pz, when taking effort level el, the larger is the information rent granted
to a firm managing a type h site (appendix 7).
NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
The purpose of this section is to derive some generally interpretable insights for
comparing the efficiency implications of incentive-compatible contract design under
different information environments.
25 It investigates the implications of (i) the magnitude
of both types' conservation costs, (ii) the differences thereof across types and (iii) the
additivity question of contracting inefficiencies in contracts which address 'hidden effort'
and 'hidden type' simultaneously. Efficiency of public-private conservation contracts is
measured in terms of the contracting inefficiency (information rent and risk premia)
associated with incentive compatible contract design.
Parameter Specifications: Conservation Costs, Site Types and Risk Preferences
The numerical simulations use the following assumptions: Forest sites are of one
standard size (1 ha). Each firm's reservation profit is independent of type and amounts to
$1000 per site at effort e0. Conservation efforts el and eh are assumed to reduce the firm's
reservation profit by 10% and 30%, respectively (opportunity cost of conservation), which
corresponds to forgone profits of $100 and $300 per site. There exists an equal proportion
of forest sites type l and h. All firms have homogeneous risk preferences. They are
described by a von-Neuman-Morgenstern utility function and represented by a functional
form U[NR] = [NR]
α . NR denotes the firm's net revenues from production plus
conservation transfers, and α  is a coefficient of risk aversion.
26
                                                
25 As mentioned before, risk-neutrality in the hidden effort - hidden type model effectively reduces the problem to
hidden type only [25]. Introducing risk-aversion allows for modeling contract structures for four information
scenarios. Risk-premia as well as information rents to sites type h are isolated.
26 The utility function implies CRRA. For risk neutral firms α  = 1 and for risk averse firms 0 < α   < 1, explicitly α  = 0.7.19
Type specific conditional probabilities for the numerical examples are specified to
satisfy the single crossing property. With three effort levels, two site types and two
observable signals, conditional probabilities for each type are chosen as in table 1.
Table 1:Type-Specific Conditional Probabilities of Conservation Outcome, (ρρρρ
k
ji)
Results of Base Specifications
Contracting Inefficiencies across Information Scenarios
Solving the program cost minimization problem derives incentive-compatible
conservation contracts for a sequence of information scenarios. Depending on the
information scenario, the objective function as well as the number of constraints changes.
Table 2 provides the numerical results under the base parameter specification. The
table shows the total expected transfers from regulator to firms, the conservation contract
schedule (to and tz), the actual conservation cost and the contracting inefficiencies as
percent of conservation costs for each of the four different information scenarios. The
model behaves as anticipated.
 27
In the 'hidden effort only' model, the participation and incentive compatibility
constraints of both types are binding; the expected transfer to both types increases in
comparison to the full information case; and to is zero for sites type l. Also, notice that the
aggregate inefficiency of the total expected transfer (in percent) is skewed upwards, despite
the fact that both types are represented equally in the population. This originates in the
proportionally higher risk premium for type h sites. All firms satisfy their reservation utility
(125.9) with equality. In the 'hidden type only'
                                                
27 The set-up for hidden effort and the basic cost minimization program for all scenarios are given in appendix 8.
type
proportion
effort Po Pz Po Pz
e o = 0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
e l  = 100 0.80 0.20 0.70 0.30
e h  = 300 0.65 0.35 0.50 0.50
Type l Type h
50% 50%Table 2:Contract Structures across Information Scenarios
Type l Type h Total Type l Type h Total Type l Type h Total Type l Type h Total
type proportion 50% 50% (1) 50% 50% (2) 50% 50% (3) 50% 50% (4)
Exp. Transfer 100.00 300.00 200.00 105.96 343.38 224.67 100.00 400.00 250.00 121.42 437.67 279.55
t
k
o ($units) 100.00 300.00 0.00 -188.31 -100.00 -100.00 -89.41 -89.41
t
k
z ($units) 100.00 300.00 529.82 875.07 900.00 900.00 964.76 964.76
Conservation Costs 100.00 300.00 200.00 100.00 300.00 200.00 100.00 300.00 200.00 100.00 300.00 200.00
Inefficiency 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.96 43.38 24.67 0.00 100.00 50.00 21.42 137.67 79.55
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Hidden Effort - Hidden Type 
(Risk-Averse Firms)21
model (risk-neutral firms), type h sites extract an information rent, while type l sites satisfy
their reservation utility. Notice that the difference in performance-based pay-offs
(variability of the incentive schedule) increases for type l in comparison to the 'hidden effort
only' scenario, while it decreases for type h. Risk neutrality, however, renders the increase
of variability inconsequential. The contracting inefficiency entirely results from the
information rent extracted by type h sites.
In the 'hidden effort – hidden type' model, the regulator offers a menu of contracts
specified in terms of expected transfers and expected conservation outcomes to separate
types. The optimization program renders contract structures such that firms self-select
according to their privately known sit type characteristics. In addition to the risk-premia,
the excess transfer captures the information rent paid to type h sites, indicated by the higher
utility level of type h sites, as reported in table 2. Comparing 'hidden effort only' with
'hidden effort - hidden type', one notices that the variability of the incentive schedule
changes type-specifically between the two information scenarios. For type l sites, the
variability of the incentive schedule becomes more variable with hidden effort - hidden type
compared to hidden effort only. In contrast, the variability of the incentive schedule
decreases for type h sites. In contrast, the expected utility of type l remains unchanged
despite the higher expected transfer in this scenario.
One policy question concerns the relative importance of 'hidden effort' and 'hidden
type'. As table 2 shows, in the given example 'hidden type' introduces a larger inefficiency
than hidden effort. According to the numerical results of the base specification as shown in
table 2, the total contracting inefficiency in the 'hidden type only' model (25%) exceeds the
total contracting inefficiency associated in the 'hidden effort only' model (12%). However,
despite the apparently larger efficiency impacts of hidden type, the underlying numerical
specification of the model matters and it is difficult to infer a general statement about the
relative importance of hidden effort compared to hidden type.
28
Additivity of the Information Inefficiencies
We refer to contracting inefficiencies as 'super-additive' if the sum of the
inefficiencies from 'hidden effort' plus 'hidden type' is smaller than the inefficiency from
the combined problem of 'hidden effort - hidden type'. In contrast, if efficiencies are sub-
additive the converse is true. Stewart (1994) suggests that the inefficiencies resulting from
'hidden effort - hidden type' are sub-additive. Numerical results of this study, using a
different modelling approach, suggest more differentiated results.
The previous table 2 compares the size of the contracting inefficiencies across
information scenarios. It reports the total expected transfers, weighted by the respective
type proportions, indicated in columns (1) through (4), and the respective conservation
                                                
28  Foremost, notice that the chosen utility function exhibits little curvature over the relevant income range underlying the
simulations. I.e., over the relevant range, the specification of the utility function shows a low degree of risk aversion.22
costs at each effort level. This allows calculating the excess transfer over and above costs to
induce efficient effort levels under each scenario. The comparison for total expected
transfers (i.e. transfers to the sum of both site types) reveals that the contracting
inefficiency with 'hidden effort - hidden type' is larger (39.77%) than the sum of the
inefficiencies associated with the individual problems (12.34% plus 25.00%, respectively).
Thus, the contracting inefficiencies when considering the sum of all sites are super-
additive.
However, when analysing both site types separately one notices that for type l sites
(low opportunity costs of public good conservation) the information inefficiency is super-
additive, while for type h sites (high opportunity costs of public good conservation) the
information inefficiency is sub-additive. Type h's expected risk premium as well as the
information rent is smaller under 'hidden effort - hidden type' than in the isolated
information problems.
29 However, the increase of the necessary payment for type l sites
when both problems occur simultaneously overrides this effect. This results in super-
additive information inefficiencies when considering expected transfers to all sites.   
The base model assumes an equal proportion of high and low site types. The
following figure 1 shows total expected contracting inefficiencies for 'hidden effort only',
'hidden type only' and 'hidden effort-hidden type' on the vertical axis, and type h site
proportions on the horizontal axis.
Figure 1: Contracting Inefficiencies and Proportions of type h sites
                                                
29 Compare for type h: ‘Hidden effort –hidden type’ with 42.80 and 94.90 for risk premium and information rent,
respectively, but 43.40 (‘hidden effort only’) and 100.00 (‘hidden type only’). See appendix 9.
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In all information scenarios, contracting inefficiencies are increasing in the
proportion of type h sites, but at a decreasing rate. Unsurprisingly, altering the type
proportions changes the total additivity of contracting inefficiencies. Given the discrete
specifications of this example, the aggregated contracting inefficiencies of all sites are
super-additive, for values of υ
h ≤  0.7, but sub-additive for values of υ
h ≥  0.8. Moreover, as
υ
h increases the difference between the costs of inefficiency in the combined 'hidden effort
- hidden type' problem and the sum of the isolated problems is decreasing. That is, if type h
is represented at a high proportion, the sub-additivity of type h over-rides the super-
additivity of type l.
Efficiency Implications of Changes in Conservation Costs
For 'hidden effort only' the analytical results had established previously that the
expected transfers to the agent, irrespective of type, increase unambiguously in
conservation costs. In contrast, for 'hidden effort – hidden type' the analytical results show
an ambiguous behaviour of the information rent, as it increases in conservation costs of
sites type h, but decreases in conservation costs of sites type l. The numerical analysis helps
to better understand the relationship between conservation costs in terms of (i) their
magnitude, and (ii) their differences across site types and the inefficiencies associated with
incentive compatible contracts. This is important because it provides policy guidance for
conservation contracts and possible alternatives.
Changes in conservation costs are simulated by a percentage increase, up to 50%
of each type's base conservation costs (di). The simultaneous and equal increase in
conservation costs to both types implies that the ratio of conservation costs between type l
and type h sites remains unchanged. Table 3 shows the response of the contracting
inefficiencies to an increase of both types' conservation costs across information scenarios,
and complements the analytical results.Table 3:Conservation Costs and Efficiency Implications across Information Scenarios
Type l Type h Total Type l Type h Total Type l Type h Total Type l Type h Total
0,5 0,5 (1) 0,5 0,5 (2) 0,5 0,5 (3) 0,5 0,5 (4)
Base Expected Transfer 100,00 300,00 200,00 105,96 343,38 224,67 100,00 400,00 250,00 121,42 437,67 279,55
Conservation Cost 100,00 300,00 200,00 100,00 300,00 200,00 100,00 300,00 200,00 100,00 300,00 200,00
Contracting Inefficiency 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 5,96% 14,46% 12% 0,00% 33,33% 25% 21,42% 45,89% 40%
10% Expected Transfer 110,00 330,00 220,00 117,22 389,85 253,53 110,00 440,00 275,00 135,84 486,46 311,15
Conservation Cost 110,00 330,00 220,00 110,00 330,00 220,00 110,00 330,00 220,00 110,00 330,00 220,00
Contracting Inefficiency 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 6,56% 18,14% 15% 0,00% 33,33% 25% 23,49% 47,41% 41%
20% Expected Transfer 120,00 360,00 240,00 128,59 440,55 284,57 120,00 480,00 300,00 150,69 536,44 343,56
Conservation Cost 120,00 360,00 240,00 120,00 360,00 240,00 120,00 360,00 240,00 120,00 360,00 240,00
Contracting Inefficiency 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 7,16% 22,37% 19% 0,00% 33,33% 25% 25,58% 49,01% 43%
30% Expected Transfer 130,00 390,00 260,00 140,08 497,01 318,55 130,00 520,00 325,00 166,01 587,72 376,87
Conservation Cost 130,00 390,00 260,00 130,00 390,00 260,00 130,00 390,00 260,00 130,00 390,00 260,00
Contracting Inefficiency 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 7,75% 27,44% 23% 0,00% 33,33% 25% 27,70% 50,70% 45%
40% Expected Transfer 140 420,00 280,00 151,69 562,40 357,04 140,00 560,00 350,00 181,82 640,45 411,14
Conservation Cost 140,00 420,00 280,00 140,00 420,00 280,00 140,00 420,00 280,00 140,00 420,00 280,00
Contracting Inefficiency 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 8,35% 33,90% 28% 0,00% 33,33% 25% 29,87% 52,49% 47%
50% Expected Transfer 150,00 450,00 300,00 163,42 646,07 404,75 150,00 600,00 375,00 198,15 694,82 446,48
Conservation Cost 150,00 450,00 300,00 150,00 450,00 300,00 150,00 450,00 300,00 150,00 450,00 300,00
Contracting Inefficiency 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 8,95% 43,57% 35% 0,00% 33,33% 25% 32,10% 54,40% 49%
Hidden Effort -            
Hidden Type Increase in Conservation 
Cost
Full Information Hidden Effort Only Hidden Type Only25
For ‘hidden effort only’ the results show that type specific expected transfers are
increasing in conservation costs at a decreasing rate. The numerical examples allow
isolating the risk premia to both types as an inefficiency measure. It clarifies that the
response of the expected transfers to an increase in conservation costs is composed of (i)
the cost increase in itself (direct effect), and (ii) an increase in the risk premium (indirect
effect). Relatively higher conservation costs imply a comparatively larger spread in the
agent's pay-off schedule. Assuming a given degree of risk-aversion the larger spread in
pay-offs necessitates a larger risk premium to compensate the agents to accept a risky
gamble. Consequently, relatively high conservation costs exacerbate the contracting
inefficiency associated with incentive compatible contracts.
30
In the 'hidden type only' model, the total expected transfer (column 3) increases
linearly as both site types' conservation costs increase
31, and the expected information rent
to type h changes proportionately to the underlying conservation costs. As the relationship
between conservation costs on type l and type h sites remains unchanged, so does type h's
information rent relative to its conservation cost. Thus, in contrast to the 'hidden effort only'
model, the proportion between total expected inefficiency (25%) and underlying total
conservation costs remains unchanged. However, proposition 4 stated that the information
rent of type h responds differently to changes in dl and dh (it decreases as dl increases, and
increases as dh increases). Therefore it may be possible that the first effect overrides the
second. The numerical analysis show that magnitude of type h's information rent is subject
to the sites' type difference expressed as differences in opportunity costs of conservation
(i.e. as dl and dh drift apart).
32 Thus, conservation cost differences matter for the magnitude
of the associated contracting inefficiencies.
When contracts are designed to address 'hidden effort' and 'hidden type'
simultaneously and firms are risk averse, the numerical results show an increase in total
contracting inefficiencies from 40% to 49% in response to a 50% increase in both type's
conservation costs. However, whether or not contracting inefficiencies are in general larger
at higher levels of conservation costs is determined by the interaction between (i) the net
effect on type h's information rent induced by dl and dh; and (ii) the net effect of changes in
risk premia to both types. If the information rent of type h shows a net increase and risk
premia to both types are increasing in dl and dh, then contracting inefficiencies are
increasing in conservation costs. In the given analysis, the spread in payoffs to the agents
                                                
30 The numerical results also show that the magnitude of conservation cost matters: While the risk premium for type l
sites increases by approximately one-third from 6% to 9%, the risk premium for type h sites almost triples.
31 A simultaneous 50% increase of dl and dh leads to an increase in type h’s information rent of 50% and an increase in
total expected transfers by 25% from 250.00 to 375.00.
32 Appendix 10 illustrates the behaviour of the information rent to type h in response to individual changes of di: An
increase in type h's conservation cost by 50% leads to an information rent of approximately 39%, while an increase in
type l’s conservation costs leads to an information rent of 25% (both compared to 33% in the base scenario).26
increases at higher levels of conservation costs, thus necessitating higher risk premia to
both agents (this is the case in the 'hidden effort only' model). However, the overall effect
of changes in conservation cost on contracting inefficiencies depends on the relative
magnitude of each of these individual dynamics. Only if the information rent of type h sites
shows a net increase, and risk premia to both types are simultaneously increasing in dh and
dl are the contracting inefficiencies increasing in conservation costs.
Conservation Cost and Additivity of Contracting Inefficiencies
Type differences are (indirectly) characterized by the distinctness of sites
conservation costs. Table 3 shows that the additivity of the inefficiencies in the 'hidden
effort - hidden type' model decreases, as conservation becomes more costly.  The reason is
that an increase in conservation costs in the 'hidden effort only' model  (as modeled from
10% to 50%) increases the risk premium particularly for type h sites. Contracts, however,
when designed to address address 'hidden effort - hidden type' simultaneously, off-set this
increase. The results imply that while addressing 'hidden effort - hidden type'
simultaneously is increasingly more inefficient, the inefficiencies are actually becoming
sub-additive when conservation costs increase.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACT DESIGN
Agency Costs and Information Environments
The comparison of contracting inefficiencies associated with different information
scenarios shows that increasingly asymmetric information environments between a
regulator and private decision makers lead to larger contracting inefficiencies necessary to
induce desired conservation behaviour. As these inefficiencies partly off-set efficiency
gains from private management, retaining information on effort and/ or type may be
welfare improving. This implies that the regulator must choose the efficient extend of
information asymmetry between regulator and firms when delegating management tasks
with public good characteristics.
Agency Costs and Opportunity Costs of Conservation
The paper elicits the impact of the magnitude and the distinctness of conservation
costs across sites. The magnitude of site-specific conservation costs influences agency costs
in all models. However, the relative magnitude of contracting inefficiencies in response to
conservation costs increases only in the 'hidden effort only' and 'hidden effort - hidden type'
models. With 'hidden effort only’ the risk premia increase as opportunity costs of
conservation rise. Thus, if opportunity costs are high the regulator needs to consider
adjusting the incentive compatible contract design. For example, target levels of effort
could be lowered, thus reducing the associated costs of conservation and the necessary risk
premium. Alternatively, the regulator can invest in more informative signals and/ or
increase monitoring frequency in order to improve the information about the firms'
conservation behaviour, thus reducing the asymmetry of information.27
The 'hidden effort - hidden type' model shows the same pattern of increasing
agency costs as opportunity costs of conservation increase. This increase is due to (i) an
increase in both types' risk premia, induced by a larger spread in the pay-off schedule to the
agent (variability in the incentive schedule), and (ii) an ambiguous net increase in
information rent to high conservation quality sites. While (i) is motivated similarly as in the
'hidden effort only' model, two general conclusions can be drawn with respect to the
relationship between information rent and magnitude of conservation costs. Firstly, the
difference in opportunity costs across type matters, as it influences the magnitude of the
information rent. The more similar opportunity costs between types are, the lower the
information rent to high conservation quality sites. Secondly, the information rent is
unambiguously increasing in conservation costs only if increasing conservation costs on
high conservation quality sites (dh) outweigh the rent decreasing effects of higher
conservation costs on low conservation quality sites (dl). This implies that if site types are
distinct enough in terms of their conservation costs and conservation costs are large, then
the associated contracting inefficiencies must be expected to be high, and it might indeed
be welfare improving to address the 'hidden effort - hidden type' problem through other
means than incentive compatible contract design.
Additivity of Inefficiencies: External Effects between Hidden Effort and Hidden Type
Regarding the additivity of contracting inefficiencies when comparing the sum of
the individual problems to the combined 'hidden effort - hidden type' problem, the analysis
concludes that (i) the additivity of individual contracting inefficiencies is type dependent,
(ii) the aggregate contracting inefficiencies depend on the proportion of type h sites, and
(iii) the additivity of aggregate contracting inefficiencies in the 'hidden effort - hidden type'
model depends on the magnitude of opportunity costs of conservation and their relative
difference across types.
The examples show that inefficiencies with ‘hidden effort - hidden type’ are super-
additive for type l sites, while they are sub-additive for type h sites. Additivity results from
the interaction between the risk premia (determined by the spread of the pay-offs to the
agents) and the information rent of type h sites.
33 Aggregate inefficiencies depend on the
proportion of type h sites. In the base model, total expected transfers to both types are
super-additive. However, the super - additivity of total expected transfers is decreasing in
the proportion of type h sites. While the contracting inefficiencies are super-additive in the
base scenario, they can become sub-additive at larger levels of opportunity costs.
If types are observable by the regulator, type proportions have relatively little
impact on contract inefficiencies, which is contrasted by the observation that large
proportions of type h drive up total expected contracting inefficiencies when types are
unobservable. This is due to the rent extracted by these types and the larger associated risk
                                                
33 'Hidden effort only' and 'hidden effort - hidden type' differ fundamentally in the number of signals, with two and four
observable signals, respectively. Simultaneous problems of 'hidden effort - hidden type' have an off-setting effect (are
sub-additive) only if (i) the risk premium is lower than in the isolated ‘hidden effort model’ and the information rent is
lower than in the isolated ‘hidden type model’, or (ii) a reduction in one offsets an increase in the other.28
premium. Therefore, if the proportion of type h sites is large, it might be more efficient to
treat all sites as type h sites and request a uniform conservation effort eh on all sites. This
effectively reduces the regulatory task to a hidden effort only problem. Requiring firms
with low conservation value sites (type l sites) to expend effort levels the same effort level
as high conservation value sites (eh) imposes additional inefficiencies, but depending on the
trade-off between the different effects, the policy alternative may still be welfare
improving. Moreover, the smaller the proportion of site types h is, the more pronounced is
the total super-additivity of informational inefficiencies. Consequently, if the proportion of
high quality conservation sites is relatively small, then type separation via incentive
compatible contracts is expensive and increasingly inefficient. In these cases, the regulator
might want to revert to type screening in order to identify types before offering the
contracts. Alternatively, he could re-adjust effort levels on type l sites downwards or to
minimal levels such that el = eo.
Monitoring Targets: Hidden Effort versus Hidden Type
The discussion clarifies that contracts, which deal with simultaneous problems of
hidden effort and hidden type create inefficiencies, even though they induce the desired
effort levels. The decision as to which problem to prioritize, and where to invest monitoring
efforts (either a priori type identification or close supervision of conservation activities),
depends on the specific circumstances. For the base specification of parameters 'hidden
type only' creates larger inefficiencies than 'hidden effort only' regardless of the proportion
of type l to type h. This suggests that type identification can play a crucial role in incentive
compatible contract design, and that the regulator should pay close attention to the
informational implications of the institutional arrangements when public good benefits are
at stake. However, at higher levels of conservation costs, the analysis reveals that as
conservation costs increase the 'hidden effort only' problem requires larger total expected
transfers than the 'hidden type only' problem (see table 3). Under these circumstances the
regulator should consider closer monitoring of conservation effort and to capture, as a
windfall effect, additional information on site types. Alternatively, the regulator can require
the firms to self-report on their conservation performance in combination with additional
monitoring of conservation effort.29
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Appendix 1: 'Hidden Effort Only' Model: Optimality Conditions
The regulator solves the minimization problem separately for each type. Note that
the parameters n, υ (k) and λ  are suppressed.
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z ρ  for simplification. Both constraints bind with equality for cost minimization.
The Lagrangian function is written as
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With 
j t U denoting marginal utilities, the first order conditions are:
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Combining equations 5 and 6 yields
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l t , thus yielding the optimality conditions for  * l
z t as




zl U U U t U π π π π ρ − = − + Eq. A1-834
Type h















1 )] ( [ min ρ ρ − + = Eq. A1-9







zh = + − + +
ICC-h ( )
() ] [ 1 ] [



















t U t U
t U t U
+ − + +
= + − + +
π ρ π ρ
π ρ π ρ










+ − + − −
+ + + −
+
+ − + − − + − + =
] [ ] [ ) 1 (
] [ ] [ ) 1 (




































t U t U
t U t U
t U t U U t t L
π ρ π ρ
π ρ π ρ
µ
π ρ π ρ π µ ρ ρ
Eq. A1-10
The first order conditions are:
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Re-arranging, combining and simplifying equations 13 and 14 yields the following
optimality conditions for the incentive schedule h h
z t t 0 ; for type h:
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Appendix 2: The Incentive Problem with 'Hidden Effort -Hidden Type'
The regulator wishes to induce efficeint effort levels taken by the respective types through
contracts reflected in point A and B.  Type h, however, has an incentive to move to point C,
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Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1












zh ρ ρ ρ ρ − < − , then
(a) ICC-b of site type h is binding,
(b) ICC-a of both type l and h are slack,
(c) PC of site type l is binding and PC of site type h is slack.
Proof:
Assumptions
For substantial simplification of the analysis, assume risk neutral firms. Again, we
assume ρ
k
z0 = 0. The regulator wishes to induce effort levels el and eh on site types 1 and h,
respectively, at least social cost. With risk neutrality, which implies U[π i + tj] =  [π i + tj],
the minimization is fully written as:
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Re-writing yields some simplification:37
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The following analysis will determine binding and non-binding constraints.
Incentive Compatibility Constraints
ICC-b
Assuming risk-neutral firms, and re-arranging both constraints yields
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zh ρ ρ ρ ρ − < −  there exist two possibilities for satisfying this
condition:38
(a) the incentive compatibility constraints are slack for both types;
(b) the incentive compatibility constraints are binding for type h sites, while they are
slack for type l sites
Allowing both constraints to be slack implies that both site types receive an
expected payment higher than necessary to induce efficient effort choices. As the regulator
seeks to minimize program costs, however, one of the constraints will be binding as strict
equality. Thus, the payment schedule is driven as low as possible, which suggests that type
h's incentive compatibility constraint binds with equality, leaving ICC-b for type l slack.
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This allows for a familiar interpretation of the inequality. The concavity assumption on the
expected conservation performance implies that the weak inequality can hold as a strict
inequality only. Thus, if ICC-b h is binding with strict equality then ICC-a h is slack.39
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Again, given the concavity assumption of the expected conservation performance,
this weak inequality holds as a strict inequality.  This implies that the constraints ICC-a for
both types l and h must be slack, given the assumptions  zh
h
zl
l ρ ρ <   and







l ρ ρ ρ ρ − < − . This proves parts (a) and (b) of proposition 1.
Participation Constraints
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Cost minimization implies that at least one of the participation constraints is binding.
Consider three possible cases
(i) Eq. 20 is binding and A 5-3 Eq. 22 is slack. It follows:







































d   -   d
d   -   d








zh ρ ρ ρ ρ − < − Eq. A3-23
such that  zl
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l ρ ρ <   , as assumed at the outset.
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(iii) Both, Eq. 20 and Eq. 22 are binding. This implies:
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This proves part (c) of proposition 1.41
Appendix 4: Derivation of the Optimal Incentive Schedule for 'Hidden Effort -
Hidden Type' with Risk-Neutral Firms
Based on proposition 1, the participation constraint of type l site (PC-l) and the
second incentive compatibility constraint of type h (ICCb-h) site bind with equality, while
ICCa are slack for both types. With risk-neutrality of the firms the utility function is written
as ] [ ] [ j i j i t t U + = + π π . The regulator solves the following minimization problem, where
the parameters n, υ (k) and λ  are suppressed:
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The Lagrangian function is written as 
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The first order conditions are:
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with  1 1 0 d = − π π  and  2 2 0 d = − π π .
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Comparing equations 10 and 12, it follows that the specification of the incentive






Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2:
In the hidden effort model, the program costs of type specific incentive compatible
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Applying th envelop theorem and differentiating w.r.t  dl yields:
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which is true, since  1 1 <
l
z ρ and  ] [ ' ] [ ' z l l t U U + > π π  for any concave expected utility
function (see figure).
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where     h o h d − = π π ,
Differentiating w.r.t dh yields:
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which is true since  1 <
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expected utility function.48
Appendix 6: Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3:
With hidden effort and hidden type, the information rent to types h sites is
increasing in conservation costs of type h sites, dh, but decreasing in conservation costs of
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Appendix 7: Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4:
With hidden effort and hidden type, the information rent to types h sites is increasing in

















At the optimal compensation schedule,  ] , [
* *
0 z t t , the expected information rent granted to
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z t
Cost Minimization Program for all Information Scenarios
type l type h type l type h type l type h
min 
Expected Transfers 105.96 343.38
incentive t0 0.00 -188.31
schedule tz 529.82 875.07
s.t. constraints
PC1 EU(e1) >,= U(eo) 0.00 0.00 0.00
ICC1a EU(e1) >,= EU(eo) 0.00 100.00 7.99
ICC1b EU(e1) >,= EU(e2) 11.21 50.00 5.01
PC2 EU(e2) >,= U(eo) 0.00 100.00 8.60
ICC2a EU(e2) >,= EU(eo) 17.11 200.00 16.59
ICC2b EU(e2) >,= EU(e1) 0.00 0.00 0.00
to >,= -700.00 -700.00
tz >.= -700.00 -700.00
Exp. Utility 125.89 125.89 1000.00 1100.00 125.89 134.50
Expected 
transfer
100.00 400.00 121.42 437.67









Appendix 9: Decomposition of Expected Transfer to Type h Sites
The expected transfer convolutes the risk premium with type h's information rent.
Isolating type h's risk premium and information rent from the expected transfer requires
comparison of the two information scenarios in terms of their certainty equivalent (CE) at
the reservation utility level (Uo = 125.90). In the case of the hidden effort - hidden type
problem, the certainty equivalent of type h is the expected value necessary to satisfy the
reservation constraint (certainty), given the optimal incentive schedule [-89.41; 964.76].
Therefore, calculating the certainty equivalent requires calculating the weights of the
respective outcomes, ρ , as an auxiliary variable. Thus,
7 . 0 7 . 0 ] 76 . 964 700 [ ) 1 ( ] 41 . 89 700 [ 90 . 125 + − + − = = ρ ρ o U 7 . 0 ] 90 . 179 )[ 1 ( ] 10 . . 89 [ ρ ρ − + = .
Solving for ρ  yields ρ  = 0.59, which in turn yields: 80 . 1042 ] 76 . 964 ; 41 . 89 [ = CE
The following table summarizes the results. Comparing hidden effort - hidden type
and hidden effort only, CE is actually slightly smaller for the first than the latter ($units
1042.80 compared to $units 1043.40). The risk premium for type h is calculated as the
difference between the reservation profits ($units 1000) and the calculated certainty
equivalents and results in $units 42.80 for HE/ HT compared to $units 43.40 for hidden
effort only. The information rent extracted by type h is equivalent to an expected payment
over and above costs of expected transfer minus risk premium = $units 94.90.
Table A9-1: Comparison between Hidden Effort and Hidden Effort/ Hidden Type
HE HE/HT
Expected Compensation 343.40 437.70
t0 -188.30 -89.40
tz 875.10 964.80
net revenue [profit (e2)+t0] 511.70 610.60
net revenue  [profit (e2)+tz] 1575.10 1664.80
Expected Utility 125.90 134.50
Certainty Equivalent at Uo=125.90 1043.40 1042.80
Decomposition total Exp. Transfer 0.00 0.00
Conserv. Cost taking e2 (dh) 300.00 300.00
Risk Premium 43.40 42.80
Info Rent 0.00 94.90
type-h52
Appendix 10: Response of Information Rent to Changes in Conservation Costs
Base +10% +15% +20% +25% +30% +35% +40% +45% +50%
CC type l 100 110.00 115.00 120.00 125.00 130.00 135.00 140.00 145.00 150.00
CC type h 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Total  Exp. 
Tran s fe rs
250.00 252.50 253.75 255.00 256.25 257.50 258.75 260.00 261.25 262.50
to -100.00 -80.00 -70.00 -60.00 -50.00 -40.00 -30.00 -20.00 -10.00 0.00
tz 900.00 870.00 855.00 840.00 825.00 810.00 795.00 780.00 765.00 750.00
Exp.Trans fe r l 100.00 110.00 115.00 120.00 125.00 130.00 135.00 140.00 145.00 150.00
Exp.Trans fe r  h 400.00 395.00 392.50 390.00 387.50 385.00 382.50 380.00 377.50 375.00
Exp. Rent type h 100.00 95.00 92.50 90.00 87.50 85.00 82.50 80.00 77.50 75.00
% 33% 32% 31% 30% 29% 28% 28% 27% 26% 25%

























Base +10% +15% +20% +25% +30% +35% +40% +45% +50%
CC type l 100 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
CC type h 300 330.00 345.00 360.00 375.00 390.00 405.00 420.00 435.00 450.00
Total  Exp. 
Tran s fe rs
250.00 272.50 283.75 295.00 306.25 317.50 328.75 340.00 351.25 362.50
to -100.00 -130.00 -145.00 -160.00 -175.00 -190.00 -205.00 -220.00 -235.00 -250.00
tz 900.00 1020.00 1080.00 1140.00 1200.00 1260.00 1320.00 1380.00 1440.00 1500.00
Variability 1000.00 1150.00 1225.00 1300.00 1375.00 1450.00 1525.00 1600.00 1675.00 1750.00
Exp.Trans  l 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Exp.Trans  h 400.00 445.00 467.50 490.00 512.50 535.00 557.50 580.00 602.50 625.00
Exp. Rent type h 100.00 115.00 122.50 130.00 137.50 145.00 152.50 160.00 167.50 175.00
% 33% 35% 36% 36% 37% 37% 38% 38% 39% 39%
Change in conservation costs of type h (dh)
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